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The Supreme Court and the
Preemption Question
By Hmmy J. Aj3ii Am*
and
PE=ER C. LonDmt
Introduction
With growing frequency since 1947, the Supreme Court has
been called upon to decide when Congress, by legislating in a
field such as labor-management relations, intends to displace
state power to act in the same field. The problem grows as
the Congress legislates on an increasing number of new matters
that were once only of concern to the tsates if they were the
concern of any government at all. Congressional vagueness about
its intent to preempt adds greatly to the problem that the Court
is called upon to handle. In dealing with the preemption ques-
tion the Court has made three types of decisions: (1) the fed-
eral statute may be declared unconstitutional with state power
being upheld; (2) both federal and state power may be pre-
served; or (8) Congress may preempt a field once occupied by
the states.
The aim of this paper is to evaluate how effectively the Court
resolves the preemption question which makes up a part of the
larger problem of state-federal relations. In the evaluation we
will consider two questions. First, has the Court fashioned a
clear and adequate set of guidelines to utilize in deciding pre-
emption cases? Second, is the Court consistent, or put another
way, are like cases decided in the same way?
The Court has two basic approaches in deciding preemption
cases: when the first is used, the burden of proof is on those
who aim to maintain state power; when the second is used, it is
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comparatively simple to come up with a decision allowing for
the continued exercise of state power. A justice's acceptance of
one of the two basic approaches in a given case greatly in-
fluences his views on the following questions: is there a pre-
emptable dominant federal interest; is there preemptable con-
flict or undue burden on interstate commerce; or is there a need
for uniformity that would preclude state action?
In the preemption cases that we shall review, the justices
frequently disagree about the principles that should apply to a
given case or set of cases. Mr. Justice Sutherland speaks of a
judge's freedom to apply what he feels is the proper principle
to a case when he says in Puerto Rico v. Shell Company:'
It is a maxim not to be disregarded, that general expressions
in every opinion are to be taken in connection with the case
in which those expressions are used. If they go beyond the
case they may be respected, but ought not to control the
judgement in a subsequent suit when the very point is pre-
sented on decision.
South Buffalo Ry. v. Ahern2 represents a particularly good in-
stance in which justices sharply disagreed over what principles
should govern a case. Seeing no conflict and no Congressional
objection to supplementary state action when authorized by the
parties involved, the majority upheld state power to make
workmen's compensation awards for injuries covered by fed-
eral laws. In so holding, the majority distinguished the case
from New York Cent. R.R. v. Winfield3 in which it was held, on
grounds of a need for national uniformity, that the Federal Em-
ployers Liability Act totally displaced state power to make com-
pensation for the personal injuries of employees received while
engaged in interstate commerce. Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting
in Ahern applied the Winfield uniformity test and precluded
state power. At the same time he expressed a willingness to join
his colleagues in overruling Winfield by applying the principle
employed in Mr. Justice Brandeis' Winfield dissent-a need for
diversity of treatment in railroad liability cases justifies the up-
holding of supplementary state action.
302 U.S. 253 (1937).
2344 U.S. 367 (1953).
3244 U.S. 147 (1917).
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CHAPTME ONE
Court Attitudes, Guidelines, and the Preemption Question
I.
First let us examine the attitudes and guidelines used to
justify decisions upholding Congressional displacement of state
power.
One of the more sweeping guidelines is that once Congress
legislates in a field, state power in that field immediately is pre-
cluded even though the national act does not go into effect at
once. In Northern Pac. Ry. v. Washington, ex rel. Atkinson,4
delay of federal action and and immediate preclusion of state
action was justified on the ground that railroad companies should
put their full efforts into adjusting to the new federal wage and
hour standards for railroad labor which would very shortly re-
place those of the states.
Preemptionist justices find several signs of Congressional in-
tent to preclude state action in examining the wording and scope
of dereal acts. Since the Railway Labor Act dealing with labor-
management disputes is spelled out in comprehensive terms, the
Court majority held the act applicable even to state-owned rail-
roads over the objection of dissenters who maintained that Con-
gress did not specifically mention such railroads. As a result, the
federal law precluded the enforcement of the California Civil
Service Act to the extent that it denied collective bargaining
rights to state railroad employees.5 Likewise, the Court some-
times interprets a nelaborate, comprehensive, pervasive federal
scheme of regulation as indicative of Congressional intent to
preempt a given field. An example is afforded by the case of
Cloverleaf Butter Company v. Patterson.6 The majority held that
state authority to inspect and seize packing stock butter ac-
quired by a manufacturer to be used in the making of renovated
butter for interstate commerce, was precluded by a federal
scheme of regulation spelled out in the Internal Revenue Code
which prescribed conditions under which the renovated butter
was to be made and which made provisions for its inspection and
confiscation in the completed stage if necessary. Congress draws
4 222 U.S. 870 (1912).
ri California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957).
6315 U.S. 148 (1942).
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up preemptable pervasive schemes when it provides adminis-
trative machinery to afford remedies, to mete out penalties, to
initiate and carry out programs, and to decide when federal acts
like the National Labor Relations Act apply to a certain set of
facts.7
Much disagreement exists as to when there is preemptive
comprehensive terminology and/or a preemptive comprehensive,
elaborate, pervasive federal scheme particularly in the labor-
management, alien registration, subversion regulation, and quar-
antine fields.8 In Hines v. Davidowitz,9 the majority saw a com-
prehensive federal scheme involving registration for regulating
aliens. The minority did not, partly on the ground that the state
scheme requiring aliens to carry a registration card to be shown
to the police on demand was more detailed and in fact supple-
mented the federal scheme.
A guideline that makes preclusion of state action quite
simple is found in the case of Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corpora-
tion.10 Mr. Justice Douglas held that a federal regulatory scheme
of warehouses precluded an Illinois scheme regulating the same
subject matter even though the latter was older and more com-
prehensive. In short, even if Congress enters a defined field
only partially, it can remove the states from that field totally.
Some justices, at least at present, see Congressional intent
to preempt when statutes spell out ways that federal agencies
may cede jurisdiction to state agencies should they so choose.
Section 10 (a) of the Taft-Hartley Act quoted from Guss v. Utah
Labor Relations Board" reads as follows:
The [National Labor Relations Board] is empowered, as
hereinafter provided, to prevent any person from engaging
in any unfair labor practice (listed in Section 8) affecting
commerce. This power shall not be affected by any other
means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be
established by agreement, law, or otherwise. Provided: That
7Plumbers, Steamfitters, R.P.F. and H. v. Door County 359 U.S. 854 (1959);
San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959); Labor Union
#25 v. N.Y.N.H. and H.Ry., 350 U.S. 155 (1956); Weber v. Anheuser Busch,
Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1955).
8YoungdahlI v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957); Pennsylvania v. Nelson,
350 U.S. 497 (1956); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941); Oregon-Wash-
ington R.R. and Nay. Co. v. Washington, 270 U.S. 87 (1926).
9 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
10331 U.S. 218 (1947).
11853 U.S. 1 (1956).
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the Board is empowered by agreement with any agency of any
State or Territory to cede to such agency jurisdiction over
any cases in any industry (other than mining, manufacturing,
communications, and transportation except where predom-
inately local in character) even though such cases may in-
volve labor disputes affecting commerce unless the provi-
sion of the State or Territorial statute applicable to the de-
termination of such cases by such agency is inconsistent with
the corresponding provision of this Act or has received a con-
struction inconsistent therewith.
Mr. Justice Burton dissenting in the Guss case maintained that
the proviso only makes it possible for the states and the federal
government to co-operate. Nevertheless, the states continue to
exercise their historic power within the field, either with or
without Section 10 (a).
On occasion, Congress is deemed to have preempted a field
when it makes no express provision for federal-state cooperation.
On this ground, the Plant Quarantine Act, aiming to prevent
the spread of plant diseases, ruled out the possibility for supple-
mentary state action against interstate transportation of alfalfa
hay or meal from regions found to have the alfalfa weevil.'
The majority concluded that if the Secretary of Agriculture did
not act, as in this case, no action was needed.
In San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,13 the Court
resorts to another preemption guideline commonly used in labor-
management cases. Here, the federal government displaces state
power over labor-management activities only arguably subject
to Sections 7 and/or 8 of the Taft-Hartley Act. It rests with
the National Labor Relations Board and not state boards to de-
termine whether the federal government has jurisdiction over
the concerted activities arguably protected by Section 7 and the
unfair labor practices arguably prohibited by Section 8.
In order for there to be preemption, federal agencies must
sometimes combine jurisdiction over a field with action. How-
ever, on other occasions, an agency only needs the jurisdiction
to act and inaction serves as no hint that the states may temporari-
ly enter the field. Even with this rather clear cut guideline, jus-
tices still differ as to whether or not an agency has acted in
12 Oregon-Washington R.R. and Nay. Co. v. Washington, 270 U.S. 87 (1926).
13359 U.S. 286 (1959).
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such a way as to actually preempt the states from a field. To a
majority in Pennsylvania Ry. v. Public Service Commission,'4
Interstate Commerce Commission regulations concerning the
equipment for caboose cars without platforms based on the
Safety Appliance Act and Post Office requirements concerning
equipment of mail cars when they served as end cars, were
adequate to bring the whole matter of the requisites of a mail
car when used as an end car under federal control. Dissenting
Justice Clarke saw no federal administrative action sufficient
to displace state power since the federal and the state agencies
were not dealing with exactly the same specific matters in the
general area.
The case of Farmers Educational and Co-op Union v.
W.D.A.Y. Inc.,15 illustrates another way that administrative action
can lead to preemption. Here the Court respected an informal
administrative preemptionist interpretation of Section 315 (a)
of the Federal Communications Act of 1934 even though the ma-
jority admitted that an examination of the legislative history
dealing with the passage of the act did not show much evidence
that Congress wanted to preclude state action. The minority saw
no agency "action" of sufficient weight to displace state power.
It found preemptive dicta in sundry agency regulations, but no
regulation specifically displacing state power. Mr. Justice Frank-
furter, speaking for the minority, also questioned the wisdom
of the Court in giving such weight to an administrative agency's
finding in such a situation.
The principle that federal administrative inaction does not
serve as a hint for temporary state entry into a field is applied
in Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board6 (labor-management re-
lations field, federal jurisdiction over activities subject to Sec-
tions 7 and 8 of the Taft-Hartley Act), Oregon-Washington R.R.
and Nay. Co. v. Washington17 (quarantine), Chicago v. Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe R.R.' 8 (issuance by the city of Chicago of a
railroad certificate of convenience and necessity), and La Crosse
Telephone Corporation v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
14250 U.S. 566 (1919).
15360 U.S. 525 (1959).
16 353 U.S. 1 (1956).
17270 U.S. 87 (1926).
18 357 U.S. 77 (1958).
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Board"9 The Court illustrated the use of this guideline particu-
larly well in the last case by holding that the Wisconsin board
could not exercise jurisdiction to determine the appropriate col-
lective bargaining representative, even though the National Labor
Relations Board hadn't assumed jurisdiction in the particular
matter at hand. Here administrative inaction was not enough
of an indication to allow state action because the NLRB had not
specifically ceded jurisdiction to the state. While recognizing no
direct clash between federal and state agencies, in contrast with
the Bethlehem Steel Co. v. N. Y. State Labor Relations Board
case,2 ° Mr. Justice Douglas saw possible conflict between state
and federal policies concerning labor representation and appro-
priate bargaining units.
With the eclipse of the doctrine of dual federalism, a federal
system of government does not provide serious obstacles for
national government entry into and preemption of fields tradi-
tionally occupied by the states as long as the central government
is exercising a delegated power or is taking necessary and proper
means to exercise such powers. In Northern Pac. Ry. v. N. Da-
kota, ex rel. Langer,2 the war power served as the constitutional
basis of comprehensive federal control over intrastate railroad
rates resulting in the displacement of traditional state action.
Since labor disputes of local scope between a union and a local
taxi company which picks up and delivers passengers at railroad
terminals, airports, and passenger steamship docks on the one
hand and state regulations of intrastate railroad rates and charges
on the other affect interstate commerce, Congress may displace
state with federal court jurisdiction in the first instance and with
federal regulations in the second.' Nevertheless, both matters
just mentioned would normally be in the traditional state sphere.
For justices who subscribe to some or all of the guidelines
above, it logically follows that once Congress enters a field the
states have no authorization to add to or to supplement even
the most modest of federal schemes. It makes no difference how
many gaps there may be in a given regulatory scheme. Chief
19336 U.S. 18 (1949).
20330 U.S. 767 (1949).
21250 U.S. 135 (1919).22 Superior Court of Washington v. Washington, 861 U.S. 873 (1960);
American Express Co. vs. South Dakota, ex rel Caldwell, 244 U.S. 617 (1917).
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Justice Warren, speaking for the majority in Guss v. Utah Labir
Relations Board,23 held that Congress wanted uniformity in
regulation. It was the responsibility of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board and not that of the states to fill in regulatory gaps
either by taking on a larger work load or by specifically ceding
jurisdiction to state agencies by authority of Section 10 (a) of
the Taft-Hartley Act. Following the philosophy of the Guss
case, the Court held in Amalgamated Meat Cutters and B.W. v.
Fairlawn Meats Inc.,24 that state courts without specific federal
approval could offer no parallel remedies to employers from
peaceful picketing even if the NLRB did fail to act. Above and
beyond the holdings in the Guss and Fairlawn cases, the Court
went further in Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson,5 by holding
that Congress could preclude supplementary state legislation
even if there was no need for a strictly uniform rule.
Even if supplementary legislation is tolerated, state enact-
ments which coincide with or duplicate federal statutes, fall
whether there is danger of conflict or not. The Court comments
upon this problem in Charleston and W.C.R. Co. v. Varnville
Furniture Co.,20 by saying that it considers coincidence as in-
effective a justification for the maintenance of state power as
opposition (conflict). Mr. Justice Reed, speaking for the ma-
jority in Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, held that those loyal
to the idea of co-operative federalism still could not uphold state
legislation that coincided with that of the federal government.
Instead, he followed the principle just expressed in the Varnville
case, by saying:
To uphold the power of the State of Alabama to condemn the
material in the factory, while it was under federal observa-
tion and while federal enforcement (officials) deemed it
wholesome, would not only hamper the administration of the
federal act, but would be inconsistent with its requirements.
Since there was federal regulation of the materials and com-
position of the manufactured article, there could not be similar
state regulation of the same subject.
Danger of duplication, particularly in the awarding of dam-
ages in the labor-management relations field was adequate ground
23853 U.S. 1 (1956).
24353 U.S. 20 (1957).
25315 U.S. 148 (1942).
28237 U.S. 597 (1915).
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to displace a state scheme at least in the eyes of dissenting
Justices Warren and Douglas in International Union U.A.A. and
A.LW. v. Russell.
2 7
Cases like Boston & Maine R.R. v. Hooke, 28 Marine Engineers
Beneficial Association v. Interlake S.S. Co.,,9 and Hill v. Florida,"
serve as evidence to show that there is a good deal of disagree-
ment among justices as to when the Congress and the states are
actually regulating the very same subject matter. Disagreement
results in conflicting stands on the preemption question as is
well shown in the Hooker case. The majority made a preemption
ruling on the ground that state regulation of interstate transpor-
tation of property was precluded by the federal Carmack amend-
ment to the Hepburn Act. Mr. Justice Pitney, writing the dissent,
did not see any evidence that the Carmack amendment applied
to the specific matter at hand.
Danger of conflict between federal and state governments is
an adequate rationale for preemption especially in current labor-
management relations cases pertaining to picketing and certifica-
tion of collective bargaining units. Danger of conflict is some-
times interpreted to mean possible frustration of federal policy.
It can also signify the possible upsetting of a Congressional
regulatory scheme that carefully balances the interests of two
or more groups such as management and labor. San Diego
Building Trades Council v. Garmon,3' illustrates the use of this
guideline. Here a California court was precluded by the Taft-
Hartley Act from awarding damages to respondents under state
law for economic injuries resulting from peaceful picketing of
their plant by labor unions which had not been selected by a
majority of the respondents employees as their bargaining agent.
The Court justified preclusion by explaining that when the
NLRB, as in this case, has not clearly determined whether an
activity is protected or prohibited by Taft-Hartley, such an
activity is withdrawn from state regulation. If the states gov-
erned matters potentially subject to federal regulation there
would be danger of conflict. At the time the case was decided,
27356 U.S. 634 (1958).
28283 U.S. 97 (1914).
29370 U.S. 173 (1962).
30 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
31359 U.S. 236 (1959).
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there was no tangible conflict. This type of preemptable potential
conflict resembles that in La Crosse Telephone Corporation v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Board discussed above.
A claim that a state is exercising traditional bona fide police
power does not always outweigh a claim that Congress has
entered a field and precluded exercise of traditional police power.
While the state police power to enjoin violence or potential
violence in picketing is bona fide and will stand against the
wishes of some dissenting justices, 32 power to enjoin all picketing
when peaceful is precluded by the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts
which give the NLRB exclusive jurisdiction over such matters. 3
In the Varnville case mentioned above, the Court made it clear
that a state statute concerned with railroad liability for loss or
damage to interstate shipments, would not escape displacement
by Congress merely on the claim that the state was exercising
historic police power and going beyond the requirements set
down by Congress. State police power action over water diver-
sion from Lake Michigan, the regulation of railroad cars and
appliances, and the liability for intrastate shipments was displaced
in Sanitary District of Chicago v. United States,3 4 Napier v. At-
lantic and Coast Line R.R.,35 and Adams Express Company v.
Croninger,0 respectively.
II.
In upholding state power against claims of preemption, dur-
ing the same time period as covered above, the Court generally
held different attitudes and applied different guidelines. A
fundamental attitude expressed by justices upholding state power
in the face of Congressional action is that the Court should
decline to take the lead in declaring preemption, particularly
since the Congress has the ability to specifically say if it intends
to preempt. This attitude is closely associated with the idea of
judicial self-restraint and it is expressed in many of the majority
opinions and in some of the lengthier minority opinions in such
cases as Bethlehem Steel Company v. New York State Labor
32 United Automobile A. and A.I.W. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd.,
851 U.S. 266 (1956).
33 Youngdahl v. Rainfair Inc., 855 U.S. 131 (1957).
4 266 U.S. 405 (1925).
85272 U.S. 605 (1926).
36226 U.S. 491 (1913).
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Relations Board37 and Cloverleaf Butter Company v. Patterson.38
In short, if Congress says nothing specifically about preemption,
don't imply preemption. Had the Court assumed this attitude
in deciding Cloverleaf Butter Company v. Patterson and Hill v.
Florida," Alabama would still have the power to inspect and
seize packing stock butter and Florida would still be able to set
down qualifications for union officials. Maurer v. Hamilton40
represents a case in which the Court expressed the more lenient
attitude. It refused to give weight to a statute implying preemp-
tion since Congress did not specifically exclude state power to
regulate the height and weight of motor vehicles in the Motor
Carrier Act. In Alabama Federation of Labor Local Union v.
McAdory,41 the Court saw no clear evidence that Congress
through the National Labor Relations Act precluded the enforce-
ment of the Alabama Bradford Act which regulated labor unions
in great detail. Furthermore, the exact construction to be given
to the Alabama act was still unknown and, therefore, the Court
was in no position to see any evidence of clear preemptable con-
flict between the state and the federal acts. Holding to the same
attitude as in the McAdory case, the Court dissenters in Chicago
v. Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe R.R.42 held that the fed-
eral Interstate Commerce Act did not, at the time the case
was being decided, preclude the Chicago Municipal Code pro-
vision requiring issuance of a certificate of convenience and
necessity to an operator of a transfer service moving interstate
passengers and their baggage between different railroad termin-
als in the city. It was not known how Chicago would interpret
and apply the ordinance. The Court was unanimous in its view
that an unconstitutional statute of 1906 was of inadequate force
to preclude state action by implication.43
Closely connected with the view that only Congress should
declare preemption, and then in specific terms, is the attitude
that Congress in legislating not only spells out specifically what
37330 U.S. 767 (1947).
38315 U.S. 148 (1942). Also see Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299
(1852).
392325 U.S. 538 (1945).
40309 U.S. 598 (1940).
41 325 U.S. 450 (1945).
42 357 U.S. 77 (1958).
4
3 Chicago I. and L.Ry. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559 (1913).
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it will cover, but at the same time, circumscribes its coverage,
even when the coverage is broad. By implication, the Congress
leaves room for state action. Thus in Mitchell v. H. B. Zachry
Co.,44 the Court majority emphasized the limits to the broadly
worded Fair Labor Standards Act by pointing out that it only
covers workers engaged in commerce or in the production of
goods for commerce or in any closely related process or occupa-
tion directly essential to the production thereof. Here, said the
majority, Congress had not displaced state jurisdiction over
employees engaged in constructing a dan solely to increase the
reservoir capacity of the local water system of a city and its
vicinity all within a single state. Rather than being impressed
with how a Congressionally circumscribed act allowed con-
tinued state action, the dissenters took the view that the per-
vasive federal act had just the opposite effect. The federal act
applied here because much of the water supply was to be used
by producers of goods for interstate commerce.
One can imply the need for state action from the absence of
uniform national rules in a given field. In Sturges v. Crownin-
shield,45 Chief Justice Marshall declared that absence of uniform
rules on bankruptcy left room for the states to pass divergent
laws on the subject provided that they did not violate Article I,
Section 10 of the Constitution. He concluded that an Act of
1797 and the Collection Law of 1799 did not provide a uni-
form bankruptcy rule to preclude state action. Ogden v. Saund-
ers,40 added substance to the Marshall claim that there was room
for state action by holding that state bankruptcy laws when ap-
plied to future debt contracts did not violate Article I, Section
10 of the Constitution.
Defenders of state power find other signs in Congressional
enactments that state action is not only tolerated, but greatly
needed. In Seaboard Airline Ry. v. Kenney,47 the Court held that
the Federal Employers' Liability Act did not completely displace
the states in the general field of railroad liability due to negli-
gence for the injury or death of employees. Since the federal
act contained no definition of who was to constitute the next
44362 U.S. 310 (1960).
454 Wheat. 122 (1819).
46 12 Wheat. 213 (1827).
47240 U.S. 489 (1916).
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of kin to be granted a right of recovery, the states, said the Court,
had the power by statute to do so. Over the vigorous dissent of
Justices Douglas and Black that the National Labor Relations
Act had displaced state action, the majority held in United
Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction Corporation,"
that a federal act condemning certain union conduct as an un-
fair labor practice did not prevent a state court from sustaining
an employer's common law tort action for damages based upon
the same conduct. The majority justices concluded that Congress
had provided no procedures for dealing with the consequences
of tortious conduct. In short, state action stood because Congress
provided inadequate administrative or judicial remedies. Like-
wise, failure of Congress to make larger appropriations to its
agencies regulating warehouses and labor-management relations
served as strong evidence to dissenters in Rice v. Santa Fe Ele-
vator Corporation49 and Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board,590
that Congress had no intention of ousting the states from fields
that they had traditionally occupied. The majority in both cases
was more concerned 'with the supposed Congressional intent to
construct a uniform set of regulations.
As we shall now see, defenders of state power discard most
of the signs used by the preemptionists to show that Congress
intended to displace state action.
A section of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 reads as follows:
The United States of America is declared to possess and ex-
ercise complete and exclusive national sovereignty in the air
space above the United States including the air space above all
inland waters and the air space above those portions of the
adjocent marginal high seas, bays, and lakes, over which by
international law or treaty or convention the United States
exercises national jurisdiction.
In Braniff Airways v. Nebraska State Board of Equalization and
Assessment,r' the Court saw nothing in this sweeping language or
in the language of the Air Commerce Act of 1926 to deny states
the power to levy an apportioned ad valorem tax on the flight
equipment of an interstate airline. The Court follows the reason-
48 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
49331 U.S. 218 (1947).
GO353 U.S. 1 (1956).
51347 U.S. 590 (1954).
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ing of the Braniff case in numerous other instances dealing par-
ticularly with quarantine systems, non rate and liability regula-
tion of the railroads, grain exchanges, and warehouses.
From the observation of the above attitudes, it is not difficult
to understand why justices championing state action decline to
accept a modest or pervasive federal scheme as evidence of
Congressional intent to preclude state action. In Kelly v. Wash-
ington, ex rel. Foss Co.,rl it was held that Washington had the
power to inspect the hull and machinery of motor driven tugs
which did not carry freight or passengers for hire in order to
determine their seaworthiness and safety. The comprehensive
federal Motor Boat Act and other acts did not specifically pro-
vide for such inspection.
In some cases, it has been held that neither federal adminis-
trative action nor inaction in themselves sufficiently imply Con-
gressional intent to preempt. Eichholz v. Public Service Commis-
sion53 and Welch Company v. New Hampshire,4 upholding
state action when federal agencies with jurisdiction are inactive,
contrast sharply with the sister case of La Crosse Telephone
Corporation v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board.5 In the
Eichholz case, the Court held that reasonable state traffic regula-
tions, such as the obtaining of a certificate of public convenience
and necessity before carrying on intrastate business in Missouri,
applied to an interstate motor carrier trying to obtain a federal
operators permit from the Interstate Commerce Commission. The
Commission had not yet acted. In Welch Co. v. New Hampshire,
the Court upheld a New Hampshire safety regulation that ap-
plied to carriers covered by the Motor Carrier Act as long as
the Interstate Commerce Commission failed to make the same
type of regulation.
On some, but not all occasions, the Court respects federal
agency decisions to promote or at least acquiesce in state action.
This is illustrated in Parker v. Brown,56 where the United States
Department of Agriculture, without a program of its own, ap-
proved of the California marketing control-price maintenance
62302 U.S. 1 (1937).
53 306 U.S. 268 (1939).
54306 U.S. 79 (1939).
55 336 U.S. 18 (1949).
56317 U.S. 341 (1943).
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program for raisins. In Mintz v. Baldwin,5 the Court in uphold-
ing state power, gave weight to the fact that the Department
of Agriculture had acquiesced in state measures to suppress cattle
diseases even though there were two federal measures on the
subject, the Cattle Contagious Diseases Acts of 1903 and 1905.
After criticizing the majority decision to displace state legisla-
tion, dissenters in Cloverleaf Butter Company v. Patterson,
5 8
asserted that federal and state agencies in this instance had
worked together for a long period of time in an atmosphere of
sympathetic co-operation. Chief Justice Stone said:
To find in such circumstances an intent to restrict state power
not required by the words of the statute, is to condemn a
worldng harmonious federal-state relationship for the sake
of a sterile and harmful insistence on exclusive federal power.
The dissenters in Schwabacher v. United States,9 took the same
stand and condemned the majority holding of preemption when
the Interstate Commerce Commission had condoned state action.
While some of the following cases represent outdated Court
attitudes concerning the power of the states and the national
government in the federal system, they do illustrate one of the
ways to defend the continued existence of state power. In Keller
v. United States,0 the Court saw no preemptive implications
in the federal act of 1907 making it a felony to harbor alien
prostitutes. Instead, the federal act was held to be an unconsti-
tutional regulation of a matter reserved to the states and subject
only to the state police power. In the case of New York v. Miln,61
the Court saw no indication that the federal Revenue Act of
1799 or the Act of 1819 relating to passengers on vessels dis-
placed a New York regulation requiring reports from vessel
masters that were to include the name, age, place of birth, and
last legal settlement of each passenger. Since federal and state
concerns with the passengers in question were put into separate
watertight compartments, there was no possibility of a conflict
rationale for preemption. Federal laws applied to the passengers
until they landed. State power over the passengers became legiti-
57 289 U.S. 346 (1933).
U8315 U.S. 148 (1942).
59334 U.S. 182 (1948).
60213 U.S. 138 (1909).
11 Pet. 102 (1837).
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mate thereafter. In this instance, New York was not regulating
interstate commerce, it was only exercising its police power over
a sphere of activities reserved to the states.
Veazie v. Moore,62 gives us one other rather interesting but
antiquated example of how the principles of federalism as
conceived by the justices can prevent a Congressional enactment
from precluding state action. In this case, the state of Maine was
allowed to prevent federally licensed vessels from navigating
the Penobscot River by granting exclusive navigation rights to
an improvement company. The Court held that there could be
no preemption here because the river was wholly located in
Maine and furthermore it was only imperfectly navigable.
After observing the attitudes and guidelines above, it is not
surprising that justices find it possible for state legislation to
coincide with or supplement federal statutes. One of the lead-
ing reasons for Court leniency is the fear of creating twilight
zones where neither the states nor the federal government act.
In Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Company v. Michigan Public
Service Commission,' the Court precluded the likelihood of a
twilight zone by holding that the federal Natural Gas Act, ap-
plying to sales of gas in interstate commerce which are for re-
sale, did not displace state regulation of sales in interstate
commerce directly to consumers where no resale is involved.
Mention of a few cases will show further Court tolerance of
supplementary and coinciding state legislation. In California
v. Zook,64 the Court held that california could impose penalties
beyond those prescribed by the federal Motor Carrier Act for
those who sell or arrange any transportation over the public
highways of the state if the transporting carrier has no permit
from the Interstate Commerce Commission. The majority ap-
proved of the diversity of penalties in various states because of
the varying acuteness of the problem. The minority felt that
the Congress had displaced state initiative because it had not
specifically provided for federal-state co-operation. In South
Buffalo Ry. v. Ahern,65 it was held over strong dissenting pro-
tests that the Federal Employer's Liability Act did not prevent
62 14 How. 568 (1852).
63 341 U.S. 329 (1951).
64336 U.S. 725 (1949).
65 344 U.S. 367 (1953).
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the states from awarding liability compensation to a widow of a
railroad employee injured in the course of his employment in
interstate commerce when the railroad fully advised of its legal
right submitted the controversy to the state Workmen's Com-
pensation Board. Savage v. Jones,66 and Corn Products v. Eddy,6 7
point out a typical state-federal dual scheme of regulation up-
held by the Court. The federal Food and Drug Act of 1906 pro-
hibits advertising and misbranding of foods and drugs in inter-
state commerce. States like Indiana may place positive com-
mands upon producers by requiring them to disclose the ingredi-
ents of concentrated feeding stuffs and other foods.
When the Court upheld the California Act which is very
similar to the Federal Motor Carrier Act in California v. Zook,
8
it paid service to an attitude directly conflicting with the one
expressed in the Varnville6 9 case mentioned above on page 296.
In the Zook case, the Court in effect said that coincidence and
duplication of state and federal legislation did not in and of itself,
displace state legislation.
To justices with an inclination to uphold state action as much
as possible, mere showing of a danger of conflict is not enough
to serve as a rationale for preemption. To use the terms of the
court opinions, there must be clear, actual, present, demon-
strable, or irreconcilable conflict. The burden of proof clearly
falls on those who are challenging state power. Influenced by
such ideas of demonstrated, actual conflict, Mr. Justice Frank-
furter, dissenting in United Mine Workers v. Arkansas Oak Floor-
ing Company,70 thought that the Court should have accommo-
dated state and federal interests by allowing the state of Louis-
iana to enjoin peaceful picketing of an employer by his em-
ployees and a union striking to become the employees' bargain-
ing agent, because the union in question had not compiled with
the non-Communist and other reporting provisions of Section
9 (f), (g), and (h) of the Taft-Hartley Act. Mr. Justice Frank-
furter, in conclusion, felt that the states should be able to sup-
plement the Congressional policy in Section 9 of hampering
66225 U.S. 501 (1912).
67249 U.S. 427 (1919).
68336 U.S. 725 (1949).
69 237 U.S. 597 (1915).
70351 U.S. 62 (1956).
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and discriminating against such unions by denying them im-
portant trade union rights. The majority relied on other guide-
lines and attitudes and used conflict as a leading rationale for
the displacement of state power. To enjoin such picketing would
deprice the union of Taft-Hartley rights under Section 7. In
International Union, U.A.W. v. Wisconsin Employment Rela-
tions Board,71 the majority was able to uphold state power to
enjoin work stoppages that halted production by denying the
dissenting contention that the right of work stoppage was a fed-
erally protected right. The majority contending that the conduct
was neither protected nor prohibited by the federal act was
able to see no conflict, hence no rationale for displacement of
state power. In Puerto Rico v. Shell Company,72 the court was
willing to uphold a territorial act very similar to the Sherman
Anti-trust Act on the ground that any conflict between the two
would be reconcilable.
Under this narrow interpretation of conflict, the states have
continued to act in numerous fields despite Congressional entry.
The states may license a federally licensed customs house broker
engaged in interstate and foreign commerce,73 and require that
some interstate trains stop at county seats above a stated pop-
ulation.74 In enforcing a smoke abatement code, a municipality
may order a federally licensed ship to undergo some structural
alterations before it performs the necessary job of cleaning its
fires. 75 Some state regulations designed to deal with local mat-
ters are valid even if they indirectly or incidentally touch upon
interstate commerce. On numerous occasions the Court has
failed to find demonstrable or actual conflict resulting from state
regulation of intrastate rairoad rates of interstate carriersY.7 The
same also holds for direct and deliberate state regulation of por-
tions of interstate commerce in the motor vehicle, internal labor
union affairs, and quarantine fields. From such liberal court at-
titudes as these, it is not surprising that a state has the power
to require vessels engaged in interstate and foreign commerce
to pay quarantine fees for examination as to their sanitary con-
71336 U.S. 245 (1949).
72302 U.S. 253 (1937).
7 3 Union Brokerage Company v. Jensen, 322 U.S. 202 (1944).
74 Gulf Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. v. Texas, 246 U.S. 58 (1918).75 Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960).76 Simpson v. Shepard, 230 U.S. 352 (1913).
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dition despite Congressional Acts of 1799 and 1878. The fee
also stood because it was compensation for service rendered
and not a tonnage tax.77 In Davis v. Cleveland C. C. and St. L.
Ry.,78 the Court held that the Interstate Commerce Act did not
preclude enforcement of a state law making railroad cars com-
mitted to interstate commerce subject to attachment. This type
of state action did not result in an actual conflict with federal
legislation securing the continuity of interstate transportation.
In concluding this examination of attitudes and guidelines
that negate or conflict with those mentioned in the first section,
it will come as no surprise that a key motive in upholding state
action is deference to the historic exercise of the state police
and tax powers. This motive is expressed in cases dealing with
virtually all the fields where the question of preemption has
arisen-licensing, inspection and seizure, quarantine, protection
of animals, and the regulation of picketing, motor vehicles, food
sales, railroads, grain exchanges, warehouses, water transportation,
liquor and aliens.
III.
The justices use other guidelines in conjunction with those
discussed above. However, the general feelings about preemp-
tion influencing Court use of guidelines, have already been dis-
cussed.
In a few cases, the Court considers the question of dominant
federal interest. If one is found, there is preemption. In Penn-
sylvania v. Nelson,79 the majority held that Congress recognized
such an interest and displayed state power to punish sedition
against the United States when it passed the Smith, Internal
Security, and Communist Control acts. Dissenters said that
Congress did not specifically preclude state action. On the
question of subversion, the dissent said that in the responsi-
bility of national and local governments to protect themselves
against sedition, there was no dominant federal interest.
At the risk of making unrealistic distinctions, it appears that
the Court often uses the concept of conflict as a guideline rather
than the danger of conflict or clear, actual, present, demonstrable,
77 Morgans S.S. Co. v. Board of Health of Louisiana, 118 U.S. 455 (1886).
78217 U.S. 157 (1910).
70 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
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irreconciliable conflicts as discussed above. Once again, it should
be emphasized that justices often utilize attitudes and guide-
lines of Part I, in addition to the conflict guideline, and conclude
that there is preemptable conflict. The opposite is true for
justices utilizing the attitudes and guidelines in Part II. This
explains the great lack of agreement as to whether there is
conflict in such cases as Huron Portland Cement Company v.
Detroit,0 Bethlemen Steel Company v. New York State Labor
Relations Board,8 International Union U.A.A. and A,I,W. v.
Russell,8 2 Hill v. Florida,8" and Pennsylvania v. Nelson.84
The Court, on occasion, has held that federal legislation, to
promote interstate commerce like the Interstate Commerce and
Motor Carrier acts, does not preclude state measures of a non-
penalizing character such as selected local oriented rate regu-
lation of interstate ferries and taxicabs. Concern for possible
burdens on interstate commerce enters here. 6
Justices subscribing to Part I and Part II views differ in their
conclusions as to whether Congress wants preemptable uni-
formity. The clash is well-illustrated in the following two cases.
In International Union U.A.A. and A.I.W. v. Russell,8 the pre-
emptionist minority concluded that Congress wanted uniformity
in awarding of compensatory and punitive damages against a
union for denying a worker access to a plant during a strike.
Even if no remedies were available under the federal act, cor-
rective action on the state level would merely upset the delicate
balance between labor and business interests provided for in the
National Labor Relations Act. The majority, on the other hand,
found no evidence that the act specifically gave the National
Labor Relations Board exclusive jurisdiction over the subject
matter of a common law tort action, and hence, saw no impli-
cation that Congress wanted uniform treatment. The majority
in New York Cent. R.R. v. Winfield,7 concluded that Congress,
80362 U.S. 440 (1960).
81 330 U.S. 767 (1947).
82856 U.S. 634 (1958).
83 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
84 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
85Buck v. California, 343 U.S. 99 (1952); Port Richmond Ferry Co. v.
Board of Chosen Freeholders, 234 U.S. 317 (1914).
86 8356 U.S. 634 (1958). Also see Cooley v. Board of Wardens 12 How. 299
(1852).
87 244 U.S. 147 (1917).
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in passing the Federal Employer's Liability Act, wanted a uni-
form rule on the subject of liabilities and obligations of negligent
interstate railroad carriers to make compensation for personal
injuries suffered by their employees while engaged in inter-
state commerce. After studying the legislative history of the
passage of the federal act, Mr. Justice Brandeis dissented and
held that Congress made no hint that it wanted a uniform rule.
The act did not cover all types of injuries which result from
railroad negligence. On the basis of facts showing the innumer-
able types of injuries that could be incurred, Brandeis con-
cluded that diverse treatment would be needed to adequately
cover the subject.
An examination of legislative history concerning the passage
of original statutes and amendments and the approval of inter-
state compacts, fails to bring judicial agreement on the pre-
emption question. The history is recorded in committee hearings
and reports and in the Congressional Record. The sharpest clashes
over the meaning of legislative history have come in Cloverleaf
Butter Company v. Patterson,"8 Farmers Educational and Co-op
Union v. W.D.A.Y. Inc.,s9 New York Cent. R.R. v. Winfield,90
Public Utilities Commission v. United Fuel Gas Co.,9' and Hill
v. Florida.
2
An examination of the legislative history of the 1931 amend-
ment to the Federal Warehouse Act of 1916, failed to bring total
agreement on the preemption question. Instead, the majority
in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corporation,3 held that Congress
ousted the states from the field of warehouse regulation while
the minority, seeing no preemptive implications in a broadly
worder amendment, reached the opposite conclusion.
Judicial study of the legislative history behind the Con-
gressional approval of interstate compacts failed to yield unani-
mous opinions in Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge
Company,94 or in De Veau v. Braisted.9 5 The majority in the
88315 U.S. 148 (1942).
89 360 U.S. 525 (1959).
00244 U.S. 147 (1917).
91 317 U.S. 456 (1943).
92325 U.S. 538 (1945).
93 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
94 13 How. 518 (1852).
9 363 U.S. 144 (1960).
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Wheeling case held that Congressional approval of an interstate
compact between Virginia and Kentucky, allowing all U.S.
citizens to make use of the navigable Ohio River, precluded the
power of Virginia to build a bridge across that River, which
would obstruct navigation. Mr. Justice Taney, speaking for the
minority, held that vessels enrolled under an act of Congress
had the right to navigate waters only when they were navigable.
Virginia's right to build a bridge, despite its effect on naviga-
tion, should be upheld just as was the right of Delaware to
construct a dam across navigable waters in Willson v. Black
Bird Creek Marsh Company.98 Congress negated the majority
holding and vindicated Taney shortly thereafter by saying that
the approved compact could not be interpreted so as to pre-
clude Virginia's right to build the bridge. In De Veau v. Braisted,
the majority saw Congressional approval of the New Jersey-
New York Waterfront Commission Compact as adequate proof
that Congress did not intend to preclude the power of New
York to pass a statute barring collections of levies from water-
front employees on behalf of unions having convicted felons as
officers or agents. The minority saw no such significance in the
approval of the compact and exhorted the majority to either
follow or specifically overrule Hill v. Florida, which held that
the Taft-Hartley Act precluded state power to specify the quali-
fications of a union business agent." So far, Congress has ac-
quiesced in the majority ruling.
One further court practice should not be overlooked before
we pass on to the next aspect of the problem at issue. On occa-
sion, the Court avoids the preemption issue per se, but none-
theless, makes a decision either upholding or nullifying the ex-
ercise of state power. A corporation in interstate commerce sued
in a state court to enjoin a labor union from peacefully picket-
ing the corporation place of business."8 The union sued in a fed-
eral district court to enjoin the corporation from further prose-
cution of its suit in state court. The Supreme Court majority
held that Section 2283 of the United States Judicial Code, denied
the federal district court power to enjoin the proceedings in
the state court, since it was a private litigant, i.e. the union,
962 Pet. 245 (1829).
97 325 U.S. 588 (1945).98 Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros., 348 U.S. 511 (1955).
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rather than the National Labor Relations Board or its represen-
tatives that applied to the District Court for an injunctive ruling.
The dissenters found other statutory authority giving the district
court jurisdiction to issue the injunction sought by the union.
The net result was an upholding, at least temporarily, of state
power on technical grounds.
Introduction
The key question before us is whether the Court, with its
double set of attitudes and guidelines in turn affecting its views
on the equally important questions of dominant federal interest,
conflict, burdens on interstate commerce, uniformity, and legis-
lative history, is able to give us consistency and predictability
in preemption decisions by at least applying like attitudes and
like guidelines to like types of cases.
Recent articles point out the confusion that results from pre-
emption decisions in such fields as labor-management relations
because the Court seems to be applying opposing principles to
fundamentally similar cases.99 Despite this charge, an examina-
tion of the numerous preemption cases listed in United States
Supreme Court Digest Annotated and in the Supreme Court
Reporter shows that even in the field of labor relations the Court
has shown fairly strong consistency in deciding cases. Preemption
cases fall into three fairly well defined categories which we shall
now proceed to examine. There are two categories of cases to
which Part I and Part II (preemptionist and non-preemptionist
attitudes and guidelines mentioned in Chapter One) standards
respectively are consistently applied. The third category of cases
is divided into two subsections, the first, in which Part I, and
the second, in which Part II principles are generally applied.
Cmu-= Two
The Extent to Which Like Attitudes and Guidelines
Govern Like Cases
I.
The cases in the small category of preempted state action fall
into two classifications: first, state interference with the pow-
,19 Bernard D. Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress, and State Jurisdic-
tion Over Labor Relations, Chicago Law School Record Supplement, Vol. 8, No.
1 Autumn 1958, p. 96.
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ers and duties of federal officials as set down by Congress or
federal agencies, and second, actual state nullification of fed-
erally granted rights or of a constitutional federal program. The
case of Public Utility Comm'n of California v. United States,"'
is a good example of the first type of situation. Under a Cali-
fornia act the State Public Utilities Commission had the power
to decide what constituted just and reasonable railroad rates.
In so doing, the commission could prevent common carriers from
transporting property at reduced rates for the United States. The
Court held that Congress precluded the exercise of such state
power when it gave federal procurement officers the authority to
determine when existing rates should be accepted or when nego-
tiations for lower rates should be undertaken. There are numer-
ous cases to illustrate point number two. State laws were dis-
placed when they prescribed licensing requirements that would
forbid the business operations of telephone and telegraph com-
panies authorized by federal law,101 when they forbade collec-
tive bargaining agreements authorized by federal laws,1°' and
when they prevented the enforcement of the Act of 1798 con-
cerning the return of fugitive slaves.103 In order to make con-
tinually effective a federal program of using the property of
mentally incompetent servicemen in veterans hospitals dying
intestate for the comfort and recreation of others similarly situ-
ated, the Court held that a federal statute precluded any further
application of state descent laws in such situations."° The
portions of Part I governing these cases were: broadly worded
statutes imply displacement of state power; need for uninformity;
presence of conflict; and frustration of federal policy.
Most of the cases in the category to which portions of Part
II applied deal either with the power of the states to protect
animals and the public health, welfare, and morals of their citi-
zens in the area of food and drug sales, bigamy, and prostitu-
tion, or with state power to tax and to determine their own
litigation procedures. Four of the cases deal with the protection
100 355 U.S. 534 (1958).
101 Western Union Telegraph Company v. Boegli, 251 U.S. 315 (1920);
Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U.S. 640 (1888).
102 Local 24 of International Brotherhood of Teamsters C.W.H. v. Oliver,
362 U.S. 605 (1960).
103Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 539 (1842).
104 United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643 (1961).
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of wild ducks, sponges, and fish. The South Dakota act stood
alongside the Federal Migratory Bird Act of 1913 and forbade
the shipment of common or private carriers, of wild ducks of
any variety to any person within or outside of the state.o 5 The
Florida statute forbade the use of diving equipment for pur-
poses of taking commercial sponges from the Gulf of Mexico
or the Straits of Florida or other waters within the territorial
limits of the state.100 The two cases protecting fish in Alaska
can be clearly differentiated. 10 7 In reference to the non-reserva-
tion village of Kake, the Court held that Congress had not pre-
cluded the enforcement of Alaska's Anti-Fish Trap Conservation
Law. However, since the Indian community considered in the
second case was a reservation created by Congress, subject to
the rules and regulations of the Secretary of Interior, the latter
official, in that particular instance, could preclude the enforce-
ment of the Alaska act. The largest group of cases in this category
upheld state power to require labeling of goods and to regulate
sales of foods and drugs in order to give additional protection
to the public from fraud and deception, even in the presence
of the Federal Food and Drug, the Harrison Anti-Narcotic Drug,
and the Agricultural Adjustment Acts. 08 Crossman v. Lurman'0 9
is of particular interest because the Court upheld the power of
New York through its law of 1893 to prohibit the sale of adulter-
ed foods in the state imported from overseas. McDermott v.
Wisconsin"° can be fairly distinguished from the other food and
drug cases. The Court struck down a Wisconsin statute, not
because it directed that corn syrup be labeled as such, but be-
cause all non Wisconsin labels, including those of the federal
government authorized by the Food and Drug Act of 1906, were
to be removed from the containers. This was a case of clear con-
flict. In Davis v. Beason"' and Keller v. United States,12 the
105 Carey v. South Dakota, 250 U.S. 118 (1919).
100 Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941).
107 Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60 (1962); Metlakatla
Indian Corn. Annette Island Res. v. Egan, 369 U.S. 45 (1962).
20s Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 368 U.S. 964 (1962);
Minnesota ex rel. Whipple v. Martinson, 256 U.S. 41 (1921); Corn Products Ref.
Co. v. Eddy, 249 U.S. 427 (1919).
109 192 U.S. 189 (1904).
110 228 U.S. 115 (1913).
11 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
112213 U.S. 138 (1909).
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Court upheld state power to protect the public morals by pre-
venting bigamy and by penalizing those who harbored alien
prostitutes.
On the ground that the states should be able to determine
their own litigation procedures, the Court held that the Federal
Employer's Liability Act did not displace a Minnesota law gov-
erning fees to be received by attorneys for actions arising under
the federal act." 3 Likewise the Carmack Amendment spelling
out the liability of a carrier for the loss or damage to any inter-
state shipment did not displace state power to pass a law allow-
ing recovery of a reasonable attorney fee as part of costs in suits
on contested but proper ciaims of less than $200,00 for loss on
interstate shipments." 4 State tax power is retained in the Braniff
Airways case (page 301) as are state attachment laws indirectly
regulating interstate commerce by virtue of Davis v. Cleveland
C.C. and St. L. Ry. (page 307)
With the exception of the McDermott case, the portions of
Part II governing these cases were: implied room for state action
even in the face of broadly worded statutes, administrative
inaction as a hint that states may enter or stay in the field, the
federal system as a barrier to preemption, toleration of supple-
mentary and coinciding legislation by the states, no actual con-
flict or burdens, deference to the state police power and no dom-
inant federal interest.
nII.
Now we reach the largest category of cases, composed of two
subsections. Let us first consider the subsection made up of
cases in which the Court usually holds that Congress has dis-
placed state action. This set can be distinguished from all other
groups of cases by quickly looking at the subject matter. A few
cases deal with displacement of state power to deal with bank-
ruptcy and prices. A large number of cases illustrate the Court's
113 Dickinson v. Stiles, 246 U.S. 631 (1918).
114 Missouri, Kansas & Topeka Ry. Co. v. Harris, 234 U.S. 412 (1914). It
should be pointed out however, that the Court has not been unanimous in its
decisions upholding state power in the face of the Civil Rights and Federal Com-
munications Acts to permit evidence obtained from an illegal state search or
from wiretapping to be used in a state as distinguished from a federal prosecu-
tion. See: Pugach v. Dollinger, 365 U.S. 458 (1961); Benanti v. United States,
355 U.S. 96 (1957); Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952); and Steffanelli v.
Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951).
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tendency to uphold exclusive federal control in the area of labor-
management relations governed or possibly governed by Sections
7 and/or 8 of the Taft-Hartley Act. National labor relations
acts displace state strike regulation statutes and state power to
certify collective bargaining units. A final large group of cases
shows court's tendency to uphold exclusive federal regulation
over interstate and some intrastate railroad and natural gas
rates and over railroad liability in interstate commerce.
As early as Sturges v. Crowninshield,"O6 the Court asserted
that Congress could establish uniform rules on bankruptcy and
thereby displace the states from the field. After this was done in
1898, the states could neither add to nor supplement the federal
law.
116
State price and rate control statutes as well as state power to
establish the price term of transactions fell because they clearly
conflicted, at least in the eyes of some of the justices, with Con-
gressional policy except in one distinguishable case-Parker v.
Brown"7 discussed above on page 302. In that case, the Court
satisfied itself that the federal and state schemes blended with
one another and that the California attempt to regulate prices
of raisins did not conflict with the Sherman Antitrust Act. The
California program represented state action; the Sherman Act
dealt with private action. However, in Schwegmann Brothers v.
Calvert Distillers Corp.:"" the Court held that the Sherman Act
precluded enforcement of a state fair trade law which enforced
an interstate price agreement for the maintenance of minimum
resale prices of trademarked commodities against a retailer who
was not a party to the agreement. State authorization of private
price fixing could not make such price fixing legal.
Case v. Bowles "' and Hulbert v. Twin Falls County"
illustrate the situations which caused the Court to displace state
power on grounds of conflict. State officials were selling timber
and tractors respectively, in excess of Office of Price Administra-
tion set prices.
Hulbert v. Twin Falls County and Davies Warehouse Corn-
115 4 Wheat. 122 (1819).
1 16Intemational Shoe Co. v. Finkus, 278 U.S. 261 (1929).
117317 U.S. 341 (1943).
118341 U.S. 384 (1951).
219 327 U.S. 92 (1946).
2o327 U.S. 103 (1946).
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pany v. Bowles121 show the continuing lack of unanimity on the
question of federal preemption of state price-rate control powers
and of state prerogative to establish price terms of transactions.
Even though the Court displaced state power to sell tractors in
excess of OPA stated prices in the Hulbert case, Justice Douglas
dissented on the ground that the state power in question was
such an important attribute of sovereignty that it must remain
even under wartime conditions until Congress specifically in-
cluded the states under the coverage of the federal act. In the
Davies Warehouse case, it was the dissent that urged preemption.
The Federal Emergency Price Control Act exempted public
utilities from its coverage. The majority saw no Congressional
intent to prevent the states from defining what types of busi-
nesses constituted a public utility. The dissenters citing the need
to effectively combat inflation, in part by having a uniform rule
on businesses to be exempted from the act, held that Congress
intended to occupy the entire field.
In order to preserve the integrity of federal labor policy and
in order to have uniformity, the Court has generally upheld the
power of the National Labor Relations Board to initially de-
termine whether or not labor-management conduct usually in-
volving peaceful picketing comes under Sections 7 and/or 8
of the Taft-Hartley Act, and to enforce those provisions by pro-
viding relief and/or meting out punishment. Ex parte George
22
illustrates the current Court attitude on this point. Here it was
held that a state could not enjoin picketing which was arguably
subject to NLRB jurisdiction. In addition, the Supreme Court
on original habeas corpus set aside the conviction of contempt for
violation of such an injunction. The Court had the same attitude
in Local No. 438 Construction and General Laborers Union v.
Curry123 when it set aside a temporary state injunction against
picketing to be in violation of the state right to work law be-
cause the conduct enjoined was arguably subject to NLRB
jurisdiction.
There is great uncertainty as to what type of activity is sub-
ject or arguably subject to Sections 7 and/8 of Taft-Hartley. As a
121821 U.S. 144 (1944).
122 871 U.S. 72 (1962).
123 Local No. 438, Construction and General Laborer's Union v. Curry, 869
U.S. 883 (1962).
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result, there is no clear line between state and federal jurisdiction
and the only way to determine the boundary is on a case by case
approach by the NLRB or by the federal courts. 2 4
There are strong differences of opinion as to whether the
states should be able to offer parallel or supplementary remedies
in actions dealing with conduct covered by Sections 7 and/or 8.
International Association of Machinists v. Gonzales,125 is prec-
edent for upholding state power. In this case, Gonzales sued in a
California state court for restoration of his union membership
and for damages for illegal expulsion. The California court or-
dered his re-instatement and awarded damages. The Supreme
Court of the United States affirmed the California decision even
upon admission that the wrong could have been partially re-
lieved in proceedings before the NLRB. The dissenters protested
that the Garner26 and Weber27 precedents, to be mentioned
below, were being ignored and that the states had no jurisdic-
tion over activities fully covered under Section 7 and 8 of Taft-
Hartley. Later cases such as Local 100 of United Association of
journeymen and Apprentices v. Borden,2 8 distinguish it and tend
to uphold the NLRB's exclusive jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the
Gonzales precedent still stands.
Finally, there is disagreement as to whether the states should
have jurisdiction over activities neither protected nor prohibited
by Sections 7 and/or 8 of Taft-Hartley. Cases that reinforce state
power here are International Union U.A.W. v. Wisconsin Em-
ployment Relations Board'29 and Youngdahl v. Rainfair Inc. 30
These have not been overruled. Following the International
Union precedent, the Court in the Youngdahl case upheld state
power to enjoin picketing accompanied by name calling, threats,
and by attempts to intimidate officers, agents and non-striking
employees of a manufacturer in interstate commerce. The dis-
senters maintained that Congress had preempted the field be-
cause even if the conduct was not covered by Section 8, it might
well have come within the protection of Section 7. The case that
124 San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 859 U.S. 236 (1959).
125 356 U.S. 617 (1958).
126 346 U.S. 495 (1953).
127 348 U.S. 468 (1955).
128371 U.S. 939 (1962).
129336 U.S. 245 (1949).
130 355 U.S. 131 (1957).
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serves as a basis for the displacement of state power over ac-
tivities neither protected by Section 7 nor prohibited by Section
8 of Taft-Hartley is Garner v. Teamsters C. & H. Local Union.131
Weber v. Anheuser Busch Inc.32 resembles the Garner case, but
there are hints in Weber that the states could have power over
conduct which is not clearly protected nor prohibited by Sections
7 and 8. San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon133 serv-
ing as a strong precedent for recent cases follows in the Garner-
Weber tradition.
The Court has been quite preemptive in outlook in displac-
ing three state anti-strike measures. The Michigan Labor Media-
tion Law covering all industry permitted strikes fell because it
allowed strikes at different times than the federal act and re-
quired contrary to the federal law a majority vote authorization
for any strikes.1'3 This case was governed by the doctrine that
Congress through the Taft-Hartley Act occupied the field in full
and closed it to concurrent state regulation. The Wisconsin Public
Utility Anti-Strike Law making it a misdemeanor for any group
of public utility employees to engage in a strike which would
cause an interruption of an essential public utility service, like-
wise fell on ground of conflict with the Wagner and Taft-Hartley
Acts. 1 5 The majority held to the doctrine that Congress pre-
cluded concurrent state regulation particularly since the national
act provided special procedures to deal with strikes that might
create antional emergencies. The minority saw no conflict and
no reason to forbid concurrent state legislation particularly since
Taft-Hartley did not deal in specific terms with the problem of
local strikes in public utilities. A Missouri statute authorizing
state seizure of a public transit business and injunction against
strikes pertaining to the business was held to be in direct conflict
with Second 7 of Taft-Hartley and not within the exemption
accorded by that act to state owned and operated utilities. 3 6
As with state anti-strike laws, the Court takes a preemptive
attitude when it comes to state power to certify unions as col-
i' 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
132346 U.S. 468 (1955).
133 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
134 International Union of United Automobile, A. and A.I.W. v. O'Brien,
339 U.S. 454 (1950).
135 Amalgamated Ass'n. S.E.R.M.C.E. v. Wisc. Employment Bd., 340 U.S.
383 (1951).
1S6 Amalgamated Ass'n. S.E.R.M.C.E. v. Missouri, 371 U.S. 761 (1963).
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lective bargaining representatives. In the parent case of Beth-
lehem Steel Co. v. N. Y. State Labor Relations Board,137 the
Court held that the National Labor Relations Act precluded New
York power to certify a foremen's union as a collective bargain-
ing unit following NLRB refusal to do so, particularly since the
NLRB had never renounced jurisdiction. Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
emphasizing the need for federal-state co-operation in this field,
dissented on the ground that the majority opinion made it sound
as if the national act superseded altogether state power to enter
into cooperation agreements with the NLRB. In La Crosse
Telephone Corporation v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Board,138 the majority opinion in Bethlehem was reinforced.
The Court held that the power of Wisconsin to certify collective
bargaining units was precluded even when the NLRB had not
attempted to make such a determination. Unimpressed with the
idea that NLRB inaction invited state action, the Court empha-
sized the point that the NLRB failed to exercise its statutory
power to cede its jurisdiction to a state agency.
In most cases the Court held that Congress, in passing the
Interstate Commerce, Hepburn, Transportation and other Acts,
precluded state power to regulate interstate and some intrastate
rates of railroads, on the ground that the federal acts covered
the same subject matter and that Congress could regulate and
exclude state power to set intrastate rates that adversely affected
interstate commerce. Two cases will illustrate the general Court
opinion: In Southern Ry. v. Reid,139 a North Carolina statute
penalizing a carrier for refusing to receive freight for transporta-
tion whenever tendered at a regular railroad station was pre-
cluded because it conflicted with provisions of the federal Hep-
burn Act that no carrier "shall engage or participate in the trans-
portation of passengers or property unless the rates, fares, and
charges upon which the same are transported by said carrier
have been filed and published in accordance with this Act." In
Pennsylvania Ry. v. Illinois Brick Co.140 the Court held that a
railroad following an Interstate Commerce Commission order
putting into effect an increase on intrastate rates to bring them
137 330 U.S. 767 (1947).
138 336 U.S. 18 (1949).
139 222 U.S. 424 (1912).
140297 U.S. 447 (1936).
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up to previously approved interstate rates, could ignore a state
order requiring railroads to pay shippers reparation due to the
increased intrastate rates. In a few cases, however, the Court has
upheld state power to regulate intrastate rates when the ICC had
not yet acted or when such regulations have not worked any
undue or unreasonable discrimination against interstate com-
merce.
141
The Federal Natural Gas Act precludes state regulation of
interstate, but not intrastate natural gas sales. In holding that
Congress had not occupied the whole field, the Court found that
a state may continue to regulate the rates for natural gas trans-
ported interstate and sold directly to consumers within the
state." 2 Likewise, the Michigan Public Service Commission con-
tinued to have the power to require a natural gas company en-
gaged in interstate commerce to obtain a certificate of public
convenience and necessity before selling gas directly to local
consumers.143 The Court held in this case that since the Natural
Gas Act applied only to sales of gas in interstate commerce which
are for resale, it did not preclude state regulation of sales made
directly to consumers. Justices Douglas and Frankfurter, in
dissent, saw preemption because the Federal Power Commission
had exercised authority many times over transportation of natural
gas for direct sales to consumers.
The rationale for federal supersedure of most state statutes
concerning the liability of railroads consists of the following:
need for uniformity in regulating the same subject matter, avoid-
ance of conflict, and Congressional intent to occupy the whole
field as based on an examination of legislative history. Hence
the Carmack Amendment to the Hepburn Act which put the
responsibility for loss of or injury to cargo upon the initial
carrier superseded all state statutes limiting recovery for loss
or injury to goods in transportation to an agreed or declared
value. 44 The Federal Employer's Liability Act of 1908 as amend-
ed in 1910, displaced all state legislation concerning railroad lia-
141 Simpson v. Shepard, 280 U.S. 352 (1918).
142 Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 332 U.S. 507
(1947).
143 Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 341 U.S.
329 (1951).
144 Edward S. Corwin Ed., The Constitution of the United States of America,
Analysis and Interpretation (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1953)
p. 247.
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bility due to negligence for injuries to or death of railroad em-
ployees engaged in interstate commerce.145 The exclusiveness of
the federal liability act is shown in New York Cent. R.R. v. Win-
field. '4 The Court held that since Congress fully covered the
subject no room existed for state regulation even of injuries oc-
curring without fault of the carriers to which the federal act
provided no remedy. Thus, New York was precluded from making
an award under its Workmen's Compensation Act for injuries
not attributable to the negligence of the carrier which were
obtained by an employee of an interstate railroad while both
were engaged in interstate commerce. Mr. Justice Douglas, dis-
senting in South Buffalo Ry. v. Ahern,147 declared when the Court
upheld a New York statute permitting a state board, with em-
ployer and claimant approval, to make workmen's compensation
awards in respect to injuries subject to the Federal Employer's
Liability Act. On numerous occasions, however, the Court has
shown consistency by upholding state power to award damages
for the injury or death of railroad employees injured in intra-
state commerce.
48
The application of both Part I and II attitudes and guidelines
is particularly apparent in this set of cases. The preemptionist
saw the following signs as heralding the preclusion of state ac-
tion: modest and pervasive federal schemes not to be supple-
mented or bolstered; matters arguably subject to exclusive fed-
eral jurisdiction; absence of specific federal authorization for
state action; danger of conflict; and coincidence of state and
federal legislation. To the preemptionist, federal administrative
inaction was not the signal for the states to enter a given field.
State police power could not act as a barrier to the exercise of
constitutional federal power. The non-preemptionist held to the
view that it is up to Congress and not the Court to make specific
preemption declarations. Likewise, this group assumed the fol-
lowing: Congress limits itself automatically when it spells out
what it intends to do; the states may supplement and bolster
federal schemes; federal administrative inaction implies room
for state action; and broadly worded federal statutes and provi-
'45Id. at 247.
146 244 U.S. 147 (1917).
147 344 U.S. 367 (1953).
148 Tipton v. Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe R.R., 298 U.S. 141 (1936); Boston
& Maine R.R. v. Armburg, 285 284 (1932).
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sions for federal agencies to cede jurisdiction to the states do not
imply preemption. The danger of conflict guideline was replaced
with that of demonstrated, actual, irreconciliable conflict. The
two groups of justices disagreed on the question of conflict and
of Congressional intent that there be uniformity.
We now reach the second subsection of the third category
of cases where the Court condones joint federal-state action.
In general, the Court upholds state power to regulate general
business practices and internal union affairs. States have juris-
diction over actions arising under Section 801 of the Taft-
Hartley Act. Likewise they may regulate picketing where vio-
lence is involved, motor vehicle and water transportation, and
the railroads in areas not directly connected with liability and
interstate rates. Generally, state quarantine and inspection sys-
tems stand. Finally, state power to aid the federal government in
realizing its aims has been upheld on a few occasions.
The Court has been generous in upholding state regulations
of general business practices that promote safety and public con-
venience, that protect the public from fraud and deception, and
from common abuses such as high rates, and that prohibit or seek
to prohibit business practices or conditions deemed undesirarble
such as gambling, and the use of trading stamps. Likewise, state
measures to combat monopoly, and to prevent restraints of trade
and racial discrimination in employment have been upheld.
In only six of the general business practice cases were the de-
fenders of state power in the minority. In four of these the
minority wrote strong dissents. In one instance, Congress vindi-
cated the minority as we shall see shortly. A brief description of
the cases will give a clearer idea of the types of state power up-
held.
In exercising the general power to regulate business, the pro-
fessions, and the trades, the states may order telegraph companies
operating in interstate commerce to use certain depreciation rates
in accounting and reporting of local and interstate business.1 49
The Interstate Commerce Commission had not yet acted on this
matter. States may: (1) require produce company merchants
governed by a federal act to execute a bond against fraudulent
149 Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Neb. State Ry., 297 U.S. 471 (1936); Smith
v. li. Bell. Tel. Co., 282 U.S. 133 (1930).
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conduct and for the protection of consignors conditional on
honest accounting and handling of produce received;150 (2) re-
quire the use of containers of a certain type, form, and dimension
in the marketing of strawberries, raspberries, etc. even with the
presence of the Federal Standard Baskets and Containers Act;'51
(3) require weighing of grain received from or shipped to points
outside the state in the face of the United States Grain Standards
Act of 1916;1"2 (4) regulate grain exchanges governed by the
Federal Commodity Exchange Act of 1936;1" (5) regulate
charges of warehousemen for the handling and selling of leaf to-
bacco in spite of the Federal Tobacco Inspection Act;' (6)
make illegal gambling in grain futures in the presence of the
Federal Grain Futures Act; 55 (7) prohibit retail sales of lard
otherwise than in bulk unless put in 1, 3, or 5 pound packages or
some multiple of those numbers in the face of the Pure Food and
Drug Act of 1906;1"6 (8) have power to adjudicate claims of
fraud under state law in the transfer of a radio station regulated
by the Federal Communications Commission, 5 7 and (9) require
out of state corporations, including a federally licensed customs
house broker, to obtain a license for a small fee by furnishing
the names of officers and directors, and by reporting authorized
capitalization.'58 (Without this license the corporation could not
maintain an action in the Minnesota Courts.)
In still other cases, the Court has given Puerto Rico the
power to have an anti-trust act very similar to the Sherman
Anti-trust Act;159 Colorado the ability to prohibit discrimination
in the hiring of pilots for interstate air carriers; 160 and New York
the right to have safety regulations of its state labor law apply
to construction work on post office sites.' 6 '
A majority making rulings in favor of preemption in six cases
150 Hartford Ace. and Indem. Co. v. Illinois, 298 U.S. 155 (1936).
'151 Pacific States Box and Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176 (1985).
152 Merchants Exchange v. Missouri, ex rel. Barker, 248 U.S. 365 (1919).
153 Rice v. Board of Trade of City of Chicago, 331 U.S. 247 (1947).
14 Townsend v. Yeomans, 301 U.S. 441 (1937).
155 Dickson v. Uhlmann Grain Co., 288 U.S. 188 (1933).156 Armour & Co. v. N. Dakota, 240 U.S. 510 (1916).
157 Radio Station W.O.W. Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120 (1945).
1s Union Brokerage Co. v. Jensen, 322 U.S. 202 (1944).
159 Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U.S. 253 (1937).
10 Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Airlines, 371 U.S.
809 (1962).
'0 1 Stewart and Company v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94 (1940).
1965]
KENTucKY LAw JomNALo53
prevailed over a generally vocal minority. The preemption cases
have many of the common characteristics of those just discussed;
they incidentally regulate interstate and/or foreign commerce,
but aim primarily at governing local matters and problems.
Dissenters were silent in only two cases. Both of them con-
cerned state interference with uniform federal regulation of
the interstate business transactions of telephone and telegraph
companies. 6 2 In the third case, the majority held that the
amended Warehouse Act of 1916 (1931) precluded state power
to regulate warehouses. The dissent as already noted on page 301
saw no preemption because Congress failed to substantially in-
crease appropriations to provide for comprehensive federal ad-
ministration of the amended act.
163
In Farmers Educational and Co-op Union v. W.D.A.Y., men-
tioned briefly on page 294, the majority held on the basis of in-
conclusive legislative history and administrative practice, that
the Federal Communications Act of 1934 precluded the appli-
cation of a state libel law to a radio broadcasting license for
the defamatory statements made in a speech broadcast on his
station by a candidate for public office."64 the Federal Commumi-
cations Act provides that if anyone licensed to operate a radio
broadcasting station shall permit any person who is a legally
qualified candidate for public office to broadcast over such a
station, he should afford equal opportunities to all other such
candidates for that office. The act further provides that the
operator of the station shall have no power of censorship over
the material broadcast. The dissenters saw no preemption in this
situation because Section 315 of the federal act did not specifically
displace the states. Attempts to specifically provide for immunity
from state statutes had failed.
While the majority held that the Federal Reserve Act dis-
placed a New York statute forbidding national banks to use the
word "saving" or "savings" in their business advertising on the
ground of conflict with federally granted rights, the dissent saw
no preemption because the federal act did not specifically grant
the right to national banks to use these two words in advertis-
162 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Boegli, 251 U.S. 315 (1920); Postal Tele-
graph Cable Co. v. Warren Coodwin Lumber Co., 251 U.S. 27 (1919).
163 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 831 U.S. 218 (1947).
360 U.S. 525 (1959).
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ing.05 The dissent concluded that New York was justified in fol-
lowing previous practice in reserving the words "saving" and
"savings" to identify mutual banks that had an excellent record
in the state and were held in high public esteem.
Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting in Bowman v. Chicago &
N.W.Ry. 160 was later vindicated by Congress which upheld state
power. The majority held that Congressional silence on the spe-
cific matter plus Federal Revenue Statute Section 5258 displaced
the power of Iowa to forbid common carriers to bring intoxi-
cating liquor into the state from any other state or territory with-
out first meeting some Iowa requirements. The Federal Revenue
Statute freed railroad transportation of commodities between the
states from restrictions except when imposed by Congress or by
the states with Congressional approval. To Mr. Justice Harlan,
the statute still did not go far enough to show clear Congres-
sional intent to displace state power to protect the health, welfare,
and morals of its citizens. The Webb-Kenyon Act which placed
intoxicants entering a state from another state under the con-
trol of the former for all purposes was passed by Congress in 1918.
In a number of cases, the Court has preserved some of the
historic state power in the labor field by allowing the states to
regulate many internal union affairs. Nevertheless, some justices
dissent on the ground that states incidentally regulate subject
matter covered by the preemptive Section 7 and 8 of the Taft-
Hartley Act.11 Alabama Federation of Labor Local Union v.
McAdory6 s gives states the power to regulate the internal affairs
of labor unions in detail in the absence of a demonstrated con-
flict. Later cases give states the authority to either allow or forbid
agency shops,169 to prohibit exclusion of any person from mem-
bership in a labor organization on account of race, color, or
creed, 170 and to require a V vote for a maintenance of member-
ship clause in a collective bargaining agreement. 17 . In the last
instance the minority objected that this put a new interpretation
165 Franklin National Bank v. New York, 347 U.S. 373 (1954).
166 125 U.S. 465 (1888).
167 Algoma Plywood and Veneer Co. v. Wisc. Employment Relations Bd., 336
U.S. 301 (1949).
168 325 U.S. 450 (1945).
169 NLRB v. Gen. Motors Corp., 371 U.S. 908 (1962).
170 Railway Mail Ass'n. v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88 (1945).
171 Algoma Plywood and Veneer Co. v. Wisc. Employment Relations Bd.,
336 U.S. 301 (1949).
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on Section 8 (3) of the Taft-Hartley Act formerly interpreted
to preclude state action. De Veau v. Braisted1 2 which upheld a
New York law barring collections from waterfront employees
under certain circumstances was discussed above on pages 309
and 310. Recently the Court held that state criminal laws apply
to a union official who took for his own use employees' contri-
butions to the union welfare fund. Dissenters felt that only Taft-
Hartley criminal sanctions could and should have been applied.' 3
The Supreme Court has held that federal courts as well as
the NLRB have jurisdiction to enforce collective bargaining
agreements with provisions calling for arbitration of grievance
disputes. 4 Shortly thereafter, and partly in deference to tradi-
tional state power over labor relations, the Court held that state
courts also had jurisdiction to enforce such agreements as long
as they applied uniform federal law fashioned by the federal
courts. 7 5 The collective bargaining agreements under discussion
are authorized by Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act. Continuing
to uphold state power over actions coming under Section 301,
the Court majority in Smith v. Evening News Association76 up-
held Michigan circuit court jurisdiction of a suit brought for an
alleged violation of a collective bargaining agreement even though
the allegation if proven would constitute an unfair labor practice
under National Labor Relations Board jurisdiction. The majority
held that the preemptive doctrine of the Garmon case mentioned
on pages 293 and 297, did not apply to actions also coming under
Section 301. Mr. Justice Black dissented, on the ground that the
NLRB jurisdiction should be exclusive. If Black prevailed, some
of the cases footnoted here would have to be included with cases
under subsection one of this category.
In a particularly controversial group of cases the court ma-
jority has upheld state power to enjoin picketing connected with
violence or possible violence and to award damages for tortious
conduct connected with picketing and violence even though
some of the activities were closely governed by Sections 7 and 8
172363 U.S. 144 (1960).
-
73 Arroyo v. United States, 359 U.S. 419 (1959).
174 Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
175 Teamsters, Chauffers, Warehousemen and Helpers v. Lucas Flour Co.,
369 U.S. 95 (1962); Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
176371 U.S. 195 (1962).
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of the Taft-Hartley Act.177 Preemptionists argue that the federal
regulation is comprehensive enough to handle such problems
and that state action merely frustrates the implementation of
federal policy. Preemptionists are particularly concerned with
the possibility that defenders of state action will broadly define
the concepts of violence and possible violence and give states
greater power to regulate activities governed by Sections 7 and
8 of the Taft-Hartley Act.178
The Court allows state safety regulation of the motor vehicle
branch of interstate commerce as long as federal rights are not
taken away. Therefore, a state has power to require a permit to
drive a taxicab across unincorporated areas and from Mexico
to the United States; 179 to require carriers without ICC permits
to obtain a state certificate of public convenience and necessity
before operating in intrastate business;80 to restrict the number
of continuous hours an operator of a motor vehicle subject to the
Federal Motor Carrier Act may drive;' s ' and to prohibit on its
highways motor vehicles subject to the Motor Carrier Act that
carry other vehicles above their cabs.'- On the other hand, the
Court without dissent has held that it is up to the ICC, and not a
state agency, to interpret a carrier's right under its ICC certificate
to transport commodities.8 3 In the same vein, the Court held
that Illinois could not determine which carriers certified under
the Motor Carrier Act could operate in interstate commerce even
in punishing one of them for violation of the state road regula-
tions.'1 Such state power would deprive the carrier of federally
granted license rights without federal sanction.
The Court has been generous in upholding state health, safety,
and general welfare measures to protect the public from abuses
when they have applied to water transportation. While the Inter-
177 International Union U.A.A. and A.I.W. v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958);
Youngdabl v. Rainfair Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957); United Automobile A. and
A.I.W. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 351 U.S. 266 (1956); United
Construction Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
178 Youngdahl v. Rainfair Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957).
179 Buck v. California, 343 U.S. 99 (1952).
180 Eichholz v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 306 U.S. 268 (1939).
181 Welch Co. v. New Hampshire, 306 U.S. 79 (1939).
'- 2 Maurer v. Hamilton, 809 U.S. 598 (1940).
183 Jones Motor Co. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm., 361 U.S. 11 (1959); Service
Storage and Transfer Co. v. Virginia, 359 U.S. 171 (1959).
184 Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., 348 U.S. 61 (1954).
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state Commerce Act of 1887 precluded the power of the states
to regulate the rates of a ferry which was part of an interstate
railroad, 18 the states could still regulate the round trip rates of
an interstate ferry not operated in connection with a railroad. 8'
The power of the state of Washington to inspect and regulate
every vessel operated by machinery which was not subject to
inspection under the Federal Motor Boat Act and other federal
laws has already been discussed above on page 302. State power,
through a municipal smoke abatement code, to require federally
licensed vessels to undergo structural alterations thereby reduc-
ing their tendency to produce smoke has already been discussed
on page 306. It was not mentioned, however, that the dissenters
in this case objected strongly, on ground of preemptable con-
flict, to state prosecution against the shipowner and officers
for using federally authorized rather than municipally required
equipment.
87
While state power to impose a license fee upon federally
regulated ferry keepers with boats, having situs in the state, en-
gaged in interstate commerce has been upheld,' 88 attempts to
make the exercise of rights granted by Congress contingent upon
the meeting of additional state requirements, the payment of
state fees, or the issuance of state licenses has been precluded. 89
Therefore, the Court voided an Alabama act of 1854 requiring a
federally enrolled and licensed ship before it could leave Mobile,
to register the names of the steamboat owners, their places of
business, their interest in the vessel, and the name of the vessel.190
Veazie v. Moore, discussed on page 304, offers an exception to the
rule.
The Court has been of little help in showing precisely where
Congress intended, by enacting the Merchant Marine Act of
1920 and the Longshoremens' and Harbor Workers Act, to super-
185 New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. Hudson County, 227 U.S. 248
(1913).
186 Port Richmond Ferry Co. v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 234 U.S. 317
(1914).
187 Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
188 Wiggins Ferry Co. v. East St. Louis, 107 U.S. 365 (1883).
189 Sault Ste. Marie v. Intl. Transit Co., 234 U.S. 333 (1914); Harman v.
Chicago, 147 U.S. 396 (1893); Foster v. Davenport, 22 How. 244 (1859); Con-
trast Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299 (1852); Gibbons v. Ogden, 9
Wheat. 1 (1924).
190 Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How. 227 (1859).
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sede state power to award damages for the injury or death of
employees doing maritime work or work on navigable waters. 9'
Rather than trying to draw a line with any preciseness at all, the
Court has merely referred to a large shaded area or twilight zone
where either state or federal compensation laws could apply de-
pending upon which government acted first.
As in the motor vehicle and water transportation fields state
health and safety regulations applying to the railroads usually
stand despite claims of federal preemption. In the face of the
Federal Railway Labor, Interstate Commerce, and other acts,
the states have power to license locomotive engineers on inter-
state trains,192 to require a railroad engaged in interstate com-
merce to promote the health and safety of its employees by
providing cabooses193 to regulate the size of freight trains and of
switching crews,19 4 to forbid heating of passenger cars by stoves
on interstate trains,195 and to require installation of additional
safety equipment unless that matter has been generally provided
for by federal legislation such as the Safety Appliance Act.'96
As mentioned above, there is not always unanimous agreement
on this last point. Since, however, the Hours of Service Act of
1907 dealt with the hours of service of railroad and telegraph
operators engaged in interstate commerce, New York was pre-
cluded from enforcing an act providing for a shorter work day
than was authorized under the federal act.1
97
While more preemptive than in the cases discussed immedi-
ately above, the Court has in the case of the Interstate Com-
merce, Transportation, Natural Gas, and other acts upheld state
power to require more railroad service to promote public con-
venience. Thus a state can with Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion approval require that a railroad build a new union station. 98
191 Calbeck v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114 (1962); Hahn v. Ross
Island Sand and Gravel Co., 358 U.S. 272 (1959); Davis v. Department of Labor,
317 U.S. (1942); Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
1
9 2 Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465 (1888).
103 Terminal R.R. Ass'n. v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 318 U.S.
1 (1943).
194 Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Norwood, 283 U.S. 249 (1931).
195 New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R. v. New York, 165 U.S. 628
(1897).
196 Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Ga., 234 U.S. 280 (1914).
197 Erie Ry. v. New York, 233 U.S. 671 (1914).
19S Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R. v. Ry. Commission, 283 U.S. 880
(1931).
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However, the Court has held that the Interstate Commerce and
the Natural Gas acts respectively, give to the federal government
and take from the states first, the power to channel expendi-
tures for construction or operation to lines reasonably necessary
for the service of the public 99 and second, the power to pass
on the question as to whether a local natural gas pipeline may ex-
tend its facilities. °° While the states may require a railroad to
make physical connection with an interurban railway for inter-
change of intrastate traffic20' and to make specified stops along
its routes, e.g. at county seats,20 2 the ICC has control over the
furnishing of cars to shippers.0 3 Congress precluded state power
to require a local certificate of convenience and necessity for an
operator of a transfer service moving interstate passengers and
their baggage between different Chicago railroad terminals.04
The majority saw the transfer service as an integral part of inter-
state commerce subject to exclusive federal control while the
minority, as stated above, felt that the Court made a premature
ruling on preemption.
No clear line separates preemptionist from non-preemptionist
cases in this last group. In both instances there is some indirect
state regulation of interstate commerce.
Even though Congress has passed the Immigration, Animal
Industry, Cattle Contageous Diseases, and Plant Quarantine acts,
state quarantine measures to prevent the spread of diseases
among people, animals, and plants have been upheld with one
exception. In the one preemption case of Oregon-Washington
R.R. and Nay. Co. v. Washington, °5 the majority held that Con-
gress had occupied the field and left no room for supplementary
state action, a view held by dissenters in other quarantine cases.
Congress nullified the Oregon-Washington decision by returning
199 Transit Commission v. United States, 289 U.S. 121 (1933); Railroad
Commission v. Southern Pac. Co., 264 U.S. 331 (1924).
200 1. National Gas Co. v. Central Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 314 U.S. 498 (1942).
201 Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Mich. R.R. Commission, 236 U.S. 615 (1915).
202 Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Fy. v. Texas, 246 U.S. 58 (1918); Lake Shore
& Mich. So. By. v. Ohio ex rel. Lawrence, 173 U.S. 285 (1899).
203 Missouri Pac. By. v. Stroud, 267 U.S. 404 (1925); IM. Cent. R.R. v.
Fuentes, 236 U.S. 157 (1915).
204 Chicago v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R., 357 U.S. 77 (1958).
205 270 U.S. 87 (1926). Cases upholding state power: Mintz v. Baldwin, 289
U.S. 346 (1933); Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137 (1902); Compagnie Francaise
de Navigation a Vapeur v. State Board of Health, 186 U.S. 380 (1902); Missouri,
Kansas & Texas fy. v. Harber 169 U.S. (1898).
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to the states the power to prevent, in case of federal inaction,
interstate transportation of alfalfa hay and alfala meal from
regions found to have the alfalfa weevil. Nevertheless, the Court
held that the 1886 Act of Congress recognizing oleomargerine
as an article of food and commerce precluded Pennsylvania
from enforcing its statute against the manufacture and sale of
oleomargarine.0 6 Justices Harlan and Gray dissented on the
ground that Congress had not specifically precluded state power.
States have the authority to finance their quarantine systems
by inspection and examination fees on vessels, but not by ton-
nage taxes.207
In two of the three inspection and seizure cases the Court
upheld state laws to protect the public from fraud and from
the spread of diseases. °0 Supersedure of state power in Clover-
leaf Butter Company v. Patterson20 9 has already been noted on
page 291. A pervasive federal scheme of regulation meant preemp-
tion to the majority but not to the minority especially since state
power to take adequate health measures was involved.
One interesting category of four cases in which Court pre-
emptionists and non-preemptionists clashed involves instances
in which the states passed statutes designed to help the federal
government realize its objectives. There were sharp clashes in
all four cases. Upholders of state power predominated in Houston
v. Moore210 which authorized the states as well as the federal
government to prescribe penalties for failure to obey a Presi-
dential call of the militia in pursuance of the Federal Act of
1795. Mr. Justice Story did not take a preemptionist stand, but
he did argue that state courts should not be used to administer
federal laws. Likewise, in Gilbert v. Minnesota211 the Court up-
held a Minnesota law making it a misdemeanor for any person to
teach or advocate by any written or printed matter or by oral
speech that citizens of the state should refuse to aid or assist the
United States in carrying on the First World War. The majority
simply held that the states, in exercising their police power,
2 0 3 Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U.S. 1 (1898).2 07 Morgans S.S. Co. v. Bd. of Health of Louisiana, 118 U.S. 455 (1886).
2 0 8 Turner v. Md., 107 U.S. 38 (1883); Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U.S. 251
(1908).
.09 315 U.S. 148 (1942).
2105 Wheat. 1 (1820).
211254 U.S. 325 (1920).
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could make the national purpose their own purpose. The dis-
senters saw conflict with the newly passed federal Espionage
Act of 1917, hence a rationale for preemption. Preemptionists
prevailed in Hines v. Davidowitz, 212 holding that the Federal
Alien Registration Act of 1940 precluded the enforcement of the
relatively, but not totally similar Pennsylvania Alien Registration
Act of 1939, and in Pennsylvania v. Nelson213 -siding with the
highest state court-holding that the Smith, Internal Security,
and Communist Control Acts of 1940, 1950, and 1954 respectively,
precluded the enforcement of a Pennsylvania law prescribing
penalties for subversive conduct against the United States. The
states may still, however, punish subversive activities against
themselves.1 4 The minority upholders of state power saw no
justification for preemption, i.e. on specific Congressional pre-
emption statement; no pervasive federal scheme; no dominant
federal interest; and no actual conflict.
There are not enough cases in this last set to determine more
clearly when the states may assist the federal government, but
the two recent cases seem to suggest that the presence of exten-
sive federal regulation in a given circumstance makes preemp-
tion a growing possibility.
From the discussion of the cases in the second subsection of
the third category, it becomes evident that justices have used
the attitudes and guidelines of both Parts I and II of Chapter
One. The non-preemptionists deplored what they called a pre-
mature decision on the preemption question and they found
that Congress in spelling out what it intended to do in a given
field also set limits as to how much of the field it would occupy.
Congressional failure to appropriate and administrative inac-
tivity were signs of federal unwillingness to preempt. State free-
dom to supplement and bolster federal schemes and to eliminate
twilight zones was accepted. Pervasive federal schemes and
state-federal legislative coincidence did not in themselves imply
preemption. The non-preemptionists still maintained that con-
flict could only be preemptable if it was actual, demonstrable,
and unresolvable. Indirect regulation of interstate commerce,
even temporary interference with interstate commerce, did not
212 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
213350 U.S. 497 (1956).
2
14 Uphaus v. Wyman, 860 U.S. 72 (1959).
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represent conflict. Great deference was given to the exercise of
the state police power. The preemptionists continued to imply
preemption rather than the opposite. Preemptive signs included
modest and pervasive federal schemes that could not be supple-
mented or bolstered, coincidence of state and federal legisla-
tion, failure of Congress to specifically authorize the states to
act, and the presence of a federal administrative agency with
jurisdiction over a field whether it acted or not in a given situa-
tion. To the preemptionists, a general claim of conflict rather
than a showing of actual or demonstrated conflict was satisfac-
tory. Indirect state regulation of interstate commerce added up
to conflict. Preemptionists and non-preemptionists disagreed as
to when there was conflict, a burden on interstate commerce, a
pervasive scheme, a need for uniformity, federal agency action,
and dominant federal interest. It is not surprising that the jus-
tices in these two camps also disagreed over the meaning of
legislative history or in some cases over the preemptive impli-
cations of interstate compacts and amendments.
CHAPTm TBmF
Conclusions
One must sympathize with the Court as it tries to resolve
preemption questions. It is hard to find legislative intent be-
cause Congress is very vague and sometimes it fails to really
consider the preemption question or the impact of its legisla-
tion upon federal-state relations. Thus it remains to the Court
in effect to speak for the Congress.
An examination of the cases above shows at least four reasons
why it is difficult, if not impossible, to expect all members of the
Court as a unit to unanimously follow a like principle governing
a like case approach in disposing of individual or a group of
preemption cases. First, the real difficulty arises because justices
fail in some, but not all instances, to agree on the merits of
maintaining state power once Congress enters a field. Some
justices like Douglas, dissenting in Hulbert v. Twin Falls County,
are willing to pay a relatively larger price than their brothers
to maintain that power. It will be recalled that Douglas, cham-
pioning state sovereignty over federal inflation controls, would
have maintained state power to sell tractors above OPA stated
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prices until Congress specifically prohibited such a practice.
Unlike Douglas Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in California
v. Zook, would not risk possible conflict between state and federal
power by upholding a California statute penalizing those who
sold or arranged any transportation over the state highways if
the transporting carrier had no Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion permit. The differences in fundamental viewpoint are re-
flected in the ways that the Court uses guidelines in deciding
preemption cases. First, some justices apply Part I (Chapter One)
while others apply Part II (Chapter One) approaches to decide
a case. The first approach makes it difficult to uphold state power.
The second yields the opposite result. Second, justices disagree
on what specifically constitutes a preemptive worded federal
statute, pervasive or modest scheme, arrangement for federal
agencies to cede jurisdiction to state agencies should they so de-
sire, and agency action or inaction. Third, justices can't agree on
what specifically constitutes preemptive dominant federal in-
terest, burden on interstate commerce, uniformity, or implica-
tions in legislative history.
While there is disagreement on the proper principle to gov-
ern a case, the Court still cannot be charged with caprice. Al-
most all decisions are made in reference to one or a combina-
tion of the attitudes and guidelines discussed in this paper.
The uniqueness of preemption cases makes it impossible
to decide all of them on a strict precedent basis. A case may
have many of the characteristics of a group of other cases, but
it can so differ in one major respect that it may be justifiably
governed by a different principle. The instance in which the
Court upheld state power to regulate the local rates of interstate
ferries not connected with railroads while it displaced state
power to regulate rates of such ferries connected with railroads
comes in mind. The McDermott (food licensing), Metlakatla and
Kake (animal protection) cases, mentioned in Chapter Two, also
illustrate this problem. The distinction between approval state
price administering, and displaceable state power to enforce
private price fixing due to the Sherman Anti-trust Act, is brought
out in Parker v. Brown and Schwegmann Brothers v. Calvert
Distillers Corp.
On many occasions, cases have characteristics that make it
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possible to place them simultaneously in categories governed
by Part I (Chapter One) and by Part II (Chapter One) prin-
ciples. Justices particularly impressed with the merits of main-
taining state power, even at a large price, make the choice by
incorporating the case in the category governed by Part II
principles, while those of the opposite persuasion choose to
incorporate such cases in categories governed by Part I prin-
ciples. As a result, it becomes more difficult to distinguish be-
tveen the categories to the satisfaction of all the justices. There
is no unanimous agreement on where to draw the boundary lines
between categories of cases. This is particularly true in the
labor field in respect to the following: preemptionist category
of cases in which the subject matter is governed exclusively by
Taft-Hartley Sections 7 and 8 versus the non-preemptionist
categories of cases where the facts are governed by Section 301
of Taft-Hartley (and on occasion by Taft-Hartley Sections 7
and 8), and where there is violence in addition to picketing
(governed by Sections 7 and 8 of Taft-Hartley). In short,
justices do not unanimously agree as to what constitutes a like
case to be governed by a like principle. This problem is par-
ticularly acute in the water transportation liability field.
Finally, the Court may decide questions of state versus federal
power by invoking other guidelines. Sturges v. Crowninshield
and Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona were semi-preemption cases,
but state action was precluded in both instances because it con-
flicted with provision in the United States Constitution. State
power in the Richman case was upheld on a technicality in-
volving the jurisdiction of a Federal District Court.
In conclusion, lack of unanimity and of total consistency in
preemption cases is due to: (1) the different opinions of the
justices about the merits of maintaining state power after Con-
gress enters a field; (2) uniqueness of cases; (3) cases with
characteristics that make it possible for them to be simultane-
ously placed in more than one Court-constructed category of
cases governed by opposing principles; and (4) decision of the
issue of state power on other grounds than brought out in Chap-
ter One of this paper.
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